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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN. v. WELLER: PRELIMINARY 
BREATH TESTS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARINGS 
By: McEvan H. Baum 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that prelir:ninary breath tests ("PBTs") are admissible in administrative 
hearings. 390 Md. 115, 121-22, 887 A.2d 1042 at 1046. In so 
holding, the Court concluded that such forums are not "court actions" 
or "civil actions" under MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. Section 16.205.2(c). 
Id. at 139, 887 A.2d at 1056. 
On May 16, 2004, Officer Shuster of the Hampstead Police pulled 
over respondent Steven Weller's ("Weller") white Chevrolet after it 
crossed over a set of double yellow lines. Upon approaching Weller, 
Officer Shuster observed several clues which led him to believe 
Weller was intoxicated. Weller subsequently admitted that he had 
consumed six beers. After Weller failed a field sobriety test, a PBT 
was administered, which indicated Weller's blood alcohol 
concentration was 0.16. Weller was then arrested for driving under 
the influence. 
Following his arrest, Weller refused to submit to a chemical breath 
test. In consequence, pursuant to Section 16-205.1, Weller was issued 
a Suspension Order informing him that his license would be 
suspended. In accordancl."! with Section 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)(1), Weller 
requested an administrative hearing to allow him to show cause as to 
why his license should not be suspended. 
During the hearing, the Motor Vehicle Administration 
("Administration") admitted several documents into evidence, 
including the DR-15 and the DR-15A Officer Certification and Order 
of Suspension which contained Weller's PBT result. While Weller did 
not object to the admittance of any evidence, he did proffer that his 
one-year suspension (as a repeat offender) should be reduced so he 
could drive to and from daily inspections to fulfill his duties as an 
insurance adjuster. After considering the evidence before her, 
including the PBT result, the administrative law judge ("ALl") 
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suspended Weller's license for one year, as mandated by Section 16-
205. 1 (b)(1)(i)(2)(B). The statute provides that where a "licensed 
person" who has already refused to submit to a chemical test refuses 
an additional test, that individual's license shall be suspended for one 
year. 
The Circuit Court for Carroll County reversed the decision and 
vacated Weller's suspension on the primary ground that the ALJ 
violated Section 16.205.2(c) by considering Weller's PBT result. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether 
PBTs are admissible in administrative hearings under Section 16-
205.2( c), as well as whether the circuit court "improperly substituted 
its judgment" for the Administration in reversing the ALJ's decision. 
The Court initially addressed the Administration's position that 
Weller should not be able to appeal the PBT's admission because he 
failed to object to its introduction in the preceding forums. Id. at 128, 
887 A.2d at 1050-51. The Court noted several cases where it opined 
that issues not raised during the administrative proceeding cannot be 
raised during judicial review. Id. at 128-30, 887 A.2d at 1050-51. 
However, the Court explained that the unpreserved issue needed to be 
decided in the instant case because the circuit court did not separate 
the issues that it considered. !d. at 130, 887 A.2d at 1051. 
Addressing the ultimate issue of whether the PBT was properly 
admitted during the hearing, the Court first cited the language of 
Section 16-205.2(c), which provides in pertinent part that "[tJhe taking 
of or refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test is not admissible in 
evidence in any court action." Id. at 133, 887 A.2d at 1053. While 
Weller argued that an administrative hearing can be considered a court 
action because MD. CODE ANN., Crs. JUD. PROC. Section 1-101(c) 
does not specifically define "court action," the Court was not 
persuaded by this interpretation. Id. at 135, 887 A.2d at 1054. 
Examining the definitions of both "court" and "action," the Court 
declared that the "court action" language of Section 16-205.2(c) was 
clear and unambiguous. Id. at 135, 887 A.2d at 1054. After noting 
that the Black's Law Dictionary definition of action is "[aJ civil or 
criminal judicial proceeding," the Court differentiated between actions 
and administrative hearings. Id. at 135-38, 887 A.2d at 1054-56. In so 
doing, the Court apprised that proceedings which take place in the 
Court of Appeals, Court of Special Appeals, circuit court, district 
court, or an orphans' court are court actions, while administrative 
hearings before administrative agencies or administrative judges 
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pursuant to Section 16-205.1 are not court actions. ld. at 135, 887 
A.2d at 1054. 
Continuing its analysis, the Court of Appeals discussed case law 
that buttressed its interpretation. Id. at 136-38, 887 A.2d at 1054-56. 
The Court began by citing Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 302, 711 A.2d 
1319, 1328 (1998), where it found that collateral estoppel did not 
operate in driver's license suspension hearings because "Section 16-
205. I-type proceedings do not sufficiently resemble court 
proceedings." Id. at 136, 887 A.2d at 1054. Explaining the 
distinction, the Court in Janes stated that administrative courts are 
provided in license suspension hearings to ensure that individuals 
receive "minimally necessary due process" before an "important 
privilege" is temporarily revoked. Id., 887 A.2d at 1054. Moreover, 
the Court asserted that the General Assembly has unequivocally made 
certain that criminal proceedings under Section 21-902 of the 
Transportation Article and administrative proceedings pursuant to 
Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article are independent of one 
another by its enactment of Section 16-205(1)(1). Id. 
The Court found additional support for its conclusion in Harmon v. 
State, 147 Md. App. 452, 809 A.2d 696 (2002), where the Court of 
Special Appeals found the trial court erred in admitting a defendant's 
PBT results into evidence at a probation violation hearing. Id., 887 
A.2d at 1054-55. The Court drew a distinction between Harmon, a 
criminal proceeding in circuit court, and the case sub judice, an 
administrative hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 137,887 A.2d at 1055. 
Delving further into its differentiation between court or civil 
actions and administrative proceedings, the Court enumerated the 
lenient evidentiary standards that govern administrative hearings. Id. 
at 137-38, 887 A.2d at 1055. Such proceedings are generally infonnal 
in nature and are not bound by technical rules of evidence. ld. 
Subsequently, the Court refuted Weller's contention that 
administrative hearings are court actions because they can be 
appealed; reasoning that they are subject to limited standards of 
review, and are considered as original actions for judicial review, 
rather than appeals. Id. at 138,887 A.2d at 1056. 
With respect to whether an administrative hearing could be 
considered a civil action, the Court found such a comparison was 
inapposite. Id. at 138, 887 A.2d at 1056. Unlike the procedural 
requirements which initiate an administrative hearing, a civil action is 
commenced when a complaint is filed with a court. Id. (citing Md. 
Rule 2-101(a)). Furthennore, Section 10-202(d) of the State 
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Government Article defines administrative proceedings as "contested 
cases," rather than civil actions. Id. at 138-39,887 A.2d at 1056. 
Finally, the Court briefly addressed the second issue of whether the 
circuit court inappropriately substituted its judgment in place of the 
Administration's in determining that the ALl failed to consider 
Weller's type of employment and the length of time passed since 
Weller's prior chemical breath test refusal. Id. at 139, 877 A.2d at 
1056. In holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard of 
review, the Court observed that the review of an administrative 
agency's decision is limited to determining whether the record 
supports the agency's findings and whether the decision was based on 
an erroneous conclusion oflaw. ld. at 141, 887 A.2d at 1057. Finding 
that the record satisfied the substantial evidence test, and having 
already concluded that the PBT was properly admitted in the 
administrative proceeding, the Court reversed the decision of the 
circuit court. ld. at 144-45, 887 A.2d at 1060. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals established that PBTs are 
admissible in administrative hearings. In so holding, the Court has 
expanded the broad scope of evidence that can be admitted before 
administrative agencies. As a result, defense attorneys in DDI cases 
should anticipate that such evidence will be introduced against their 
clients in these proceedings. 
